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ABSTRACT
Research on Web credibility assessment can significantly
benefit from new models that are better suited for evaluation
and study of adversary strategies. Currently employed mod-
els lack several important aspects, such as the explicit mod-
eling of Web content properties (e.g. presentation quality),
the user economic incentives and assessment capabilities. In
this paper, we introduce a new, game-theoretic model of
credibility, referred to as the Credibility Game. We perform
equilibrium and stability analysis of a simple variant of the
game and then study it as a signaling game against na¨ıve
and expert information consumers. By a generic economic
model of the player payoffs, we study, via simulation ex-
periments, more complex variants of the Credibility Game
and demonstrate the effect of consumer expertise and of the
signal for credibility evaluation on the evolutionary stable
strategies of the information producers and consumers.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.3.5 [Online Information Services]: Commercial ser-
vices, Web-based services; J.4 [Social and Behavioral
Sciences]: Economics; I.2.6 [Artificial Intelligence]: Learn-
ing
General Terms
Theory
Keywords
incentives, signaling game, equilibrium, evolution
1. INTRODUCTION
Research on supporting credibility assessment of Web con-
tent requires the availability of benchmarks or evaluation
methods. These evaluation methods can be of at least two
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kinds: The first uses declarative or behavioral data acquired
from real users. The second uses models of reality, either in a
form that can be treated analytically or in simulations. Both
methods have different advantages. While using real data
or experiments on real users is the best empirical method
of evaluation, this method has several limitations, such as
scale and exploratory power. An important advantage of
using models is the ability of testing diverse what-if scenar-
ios, such as various adversary strategies against credibility
evaluation methods. For example, imagine that a new fea-
ture of textual Web content is empirically found to improve
the correctness of credibility evaluations by 30% when em-
ployed. Researchers are now faced with the following ques-
tions: what would be the impact of the improved credibility
evaluation on the strategies of content producers, e.g. im-
prove content honesty or presentation quality? Would these
strategies of content producers be economically sustainable?
In this paper1, we propose a new model of information
credibility based on a game-theoretic approach. The pro-
posed model is more specialized, as compared to previous
work [10, 12], and in our view better-suited for studying
the strategies of rational stakeholders involved in the pro-
duction and the credibility assessment of Web content. Our
game-theoretic model fulfills the following requirements:
1. Use asymmetric roles for users who can produce or
consume information.
2. Explicitly model the quality of information produced
and consumed by users.
3. Model the preferences of information producers and
consumers.
4. Allow to take into account the use of credibility evalu-
ation methods and to study their impact on the model.
5. Model economic incentives of information producers
and consumers.
6. Model diverse strategies of information producers and
consumers.
In our simple, yet expressive, game, we model the en-
counter of two players in the Web: the content producer
(CP) and content consumer (CC). (Of course, in a Web2.0
setting, a Web user can have both roles.) Diverse strate-
gies may be specified for the CC for evaluating information
1This work was partially funded by the Swiss grant ”Recon-
cile: Robust Online Credibility Evaluation of Web Content”
through the Swiss contribution to the enlarged EU.
credibility, but the quality of information itself is also ex-
plicitly modeled. Web content credibility evaluation may de-
pend on the content preferences of the CC and her ability to
compare different content versions. For example, consumers
with different subjectivity (or expertise) with respect to con-
tent credibility evaluation may be considered. The producer
(CP) may also have preferences concerning the version of in-
formation that he wishes the CC to accept, e.g. a strategic
(dishonest) producer may wish to trick the consumer, while
an altruistic (honest) producer may wish to provide the most
credible information. After all, in the real world, CP choices
of content are influenced by monetary costs for content pro-
duction and by monetary incentives (i.e. possible income)
in case that a consumer accepts the content.
Content providers have different strategies regarding the
truthfulness and the presentation quality of their Web con-
tent, depending on their honesty, while content consumers
may accept or reject it, depending on their expertise. Ini-
tially, in the basic game form, we assume two CP types
(of “high” and “low” credibility) and na¨ıve CCs having a
finite set of CP and CC strategies respectively, while play-
ers know the types of each other. We perform equilibrium
analysis and study the evolutionary dynamics of this game.
Then, we relax the assumption that players know the types
of each other, study the encounter as a signaling game and
find the perfect Bayesian equilibria against na¨ıve and expert
consumers. Subsequently, we explicitly model the economic
incentives of content producers and consumers of different
types for a continuous set of CP and CC strategies. This
economic modeling is employed in our simulations to study
the evolutionary dynamics by means of “learning” (e.g. as-
piration and imitation) of different populations mixes of CP
and CC types. Moreover, our simulation results verify our
game-theoretic analysis.
Our model could incorporate diverse strategies of content
producers and consumers, and different preferences or incen-
tives. Presentation quality is explicitly present in the model,
but, at the same time, it is expressively powerful to encap-
sulate a number of different Web content features that may
affect the credibility evaluation. Also, our model provides
the ability to study the impact of the various aspects, e.g.
a 30% improvement in credibility assessment, on the strate-
gies of content producers and consumers at equilibrium. Our
model is still simple enough to be analytically tractable, and
ease to simulate.
The structure of this paper is as follows: in the next sec-
tion, we describe related work on game modeling of credibil-
ity and on features for assessing Web credibility. In Section
3, we introduce our basic version of the Credibility Game, ex-
plain how it achieves the requirements described above and
perform equilibrium and stability analysis. In Section 4, we
revisit the Credibility Game as a signaling one and find its
assessment equilibrium; a signal for the consumers regarding
the content quality is communicated by producers. Section
5 provides a generic economic modeling of player payoffs in
credibility games. In Section 6, we study the evolution of the
game under different the properties of the signal, different
producer honesty and different consumer expertise. Finally,
in Section 7, we conclude our work.
2. RELATED WORK
The problem of information asymmetry (i.e. hidden infor-
mation at one of the transacted parties) has been extensively
studied in economic theory. Hidden information may refer
to hidden quality [7], where adverse selection leads to the
“market-of-lemons” effect, or to hidden type, where moral
hazard [2] deteriorates participation to the market. The
problem of assessing Web credibility may involve both cases
of hidden information, i.e. hidden quality for static pages
or hidden type for dynamic pages. Reputation is considered
as an adequate mechanism to deal with hidden information
[7, 2]. Such an approach would necessitate the existence of
credible ratings for the Web pages subject to assessment. Al-
though initial attempts towards this goal have started (e.g.
Google+, plus.google.com), it will be long before enough ad-
equate user feedback is available for the Web. Furthermore,
easy domain name changes and dynamic content generation
render associating historical information to a particular Web
content rather difficult. To this end, in our work, we refrain
from modeling the Web credibility problem as a reputation
game and leave the in-depth investigation of this issue as a
future work.
There is an extended literature on game models for online
reputation systems [2, 9], for a survey, see [3]. These games
study the incentives of transacted parties in an encounter
towards honesty [2] and truthful feedback [9]. [5] studies
voluntary cooperation in case of labor-managed firms as a
Prisoner’s Dilemma, i.e. players may independent decide
to cooperate or defect, while defect is a dominant strategy.
The problem of cooperation has two aspects: how to avoid
free-riding and how individuals convince their fellow mem-
bers that they will uphold their commitments. Cooperation
can be an equilibrium outcome, when rational individuals
act so as to preserve reputations for cooperating. Instead,
our work analyzes the incentives of Web content producers
and consumers regarding the truthfulness of published in-
formation. To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior
work that studied the problem of Web credibility as a game.
In [6, 4], the issue of incentivizing high quality of user
generated content is addressed with a game-theoretic mod-
eling. In a generic model, [4] studies the economics of high-
quality user generated content from strategic and exposure-
motivated contributors. Their model predicts that if expo-
sure is independent of quality - as it can be in our case - there
will be a flood of low quality contributions in equilibrium.
They propose a simple approach for eliminating low-quality
content based on a single negative rating. However, such an
approach is mostly relevant for blog comments and reviews
and could not be employed for arbitrary Web sites; it could
easily lead to defamation of honest Web sites by rational
competitors.
A game of persuasion is studied in [10, 12]. In this game,
a speaker attempts to persuade a listener to take an ac-
tion by presenting evidence. The conditions under which
the request is justified, from the listener’s point of view, de-
pend on the state of the world, which is known only to the
speaker. Each state is characterized by a set of statements
from which the speaker chooses. A persuasion rule speci-
fies which statements the listener finds persuasive. In [10],
persuasion rules are studied that maximize the probability
that the listener accepts the request if and only if it is justi-
fied, given that the speaker maximizes the probability that
his request is accepted. They prove that there always exists
a persuasion rule involving neither randomization (i.e. the
listener can apply a random device to determine which hard
evidence he asks the speaker to present) nor commitment
(i.e. listener commits and announces an acceptance rule)
and that all optimal persuasion rules are ex-post optimal.
In [12], it is shown that concavity is the critical assump-
tion for both aforementioned results: The listener’s utility
function is a concave transformation of the speaker’s utility
function. The model in [12] is broaden beyond binary lis-
tener’ decisions given the concavity assumption. Assessing
Web credibility somewhat resembles a persuasion game in
the sense that the content producer (i.e. speaker) knows
the credibility of the content (i.e. state of the world) and
may use presentation quality as a persuasion rule for the
content consumer (i.e. listener). However, in the Web cred-
ibility game the consumer cannot systematically reason and
justify the information credibility given the producer’s per-
suasion rules. Moreover, our signaling game model covers
the case of consumers with different levels of expertise.
Another related category of games concern arms races, e.g.
data miner against adversary feature manipulation [1], Web
spam filters against sophisticated spammers, etc. In [1], clas-
sifier chooses to utilize certain features based on their cost
for classifying data, while adversary exerts different costly
effort for manipulating different features in order for clas-
sifier to generate false negatives. Classifier’s best response
strategy is derived given rational adversaries. However, the
evolutionary dynamics of the game in [1] have not been stud-
ied, while different content producer and consumer strategies
cannot be easily modeled, as opposed to our work.
Regarding Web credibility assessment, in [13], six measur-
able factors are identified, which are related to the five main
recognized factors (i.e., accuracy, authority, objectivity, cur-
rency, and coverage of topic) for judging the credibility of
Web information, namely referential importance, social rep-
utation, content typicality, topic coverage, freshness, and
update frequency. Other methods that automatically assess
credibility aggregate different features values such as [8]: in-
formation about credentials, advertisements, Web page de-
sign, type of Website, date of update, sentiment analysis,
pre-defined search-engine page ranking, information com-
monality, source independence, source prestige, experience
with the source and authority of information source. Our
game model assumes that consumers assess content credi-
bility based only on a signal regarding truthfulness and pre-
sentation quality passed from content producers. However,
more features in the signal could also be considered.
3. BASIC MODEL OF CREDIBILITY
In this section, we introduce the basic form of our credi-
bility model and then describe the basic version of the Cred-
ibility game. In order to realize Requirement 1, our model
uses the concept of encounters between two different kinds
of users (players): the Content Provider (CP) and Content
Consumer (CC). We assume here that in an encounter, CP
produces and CC consumes information. The context of the
encounter is fixed, and part of it is the subject of the infor-
mation that CP produces and CC consumes.
CP’s actions are a choice of variants {Ii} of the informa-
tion I that CP can provide to CC. In order to fulfill Require-
ment 2, the model should incorporate some properties of Ii.
There may be various ways of doing this, but in this paper,
we shall focus on two information properties: truthfulness
(TF) and looks (L) with TF ∈ [0, 1] and L ∈ [0, 1]. Infor-
mation truthfulness depends on the honesty of its CP, while
by information looks, we refer to the presentation quality of
the content. Following the work on persuasion games, we
can model CC’s actions in the encounter as binary (CC can
accept or reject the version of information produced by CP).
Requirement 3 will be met by our model if we are able
to express the preferences of CC and CP regarding the ver-
sion of information that CC accepts. The truthfulness (TF)
property of the versions of information creates an objective
correctness ordering of the versions of I: Ii  Ij . The pref-
erences of CP can be modeled as follows. The looks prop-
erty (L) of the versions of information models the investment
that CP can make in the produced information. Increasing
L can increase the likelihood that CC will accept the pro-
duced version of I. Yet, this investment is costly (increasing
L increases the cost), and if CC rejects the produced version,
CP will incur a loss.
On the other hand, if CC accepts, then the preference
of CP depend on the TF property. We can have different
types of producers with different preferences. An honest
CP will prefer that CC would accept a truthful version of
I: CP prefers that CC accepts Ii with a high TF. On the
other hand, for a dishonest CP, the preferences may depend
on a profit that can increase if CC accepts a version of I
that is less truthful. Consider, for example, a dishonest car
salesperson that produces descriptions of cars on sale. CP’s
profit increases if CC buys a low-quality car that is described
as a high-quality one. Therefore, lower TF yields a higher
profit. This is a case of incentive incompatibility of CP and
CC.
CC’s preferences depend solely on TF. Note that CC does
not need to know in advance what the TF of the version of
information produced by CP will be. After CC accepts the
content, she will “find out” (through experience) how high it
ranks in the correctness ordering. CC may also use strategies
that rely on her estimation about the produced version of I.
This estimation may depend on both TF and L and may be
imprecise, probabilistic, or subject to systematic error (for
example, biased for higher versions of L).
CC may also use CP’s reputation in her actions based
on recommendations by previously encountered CCs. More-
over, if there are multiple CP players, then CC’s action may
be a choice of the variants of I provided by the various CP
players, or a rejection of all offered variants of I. Notice that
if CC can provide recommendations, then we are changing
the encounter, and CC becomes CP. The reputation of the
recommendation producer will be a function of its strategy
that is understood as both a strategy of choosing information
to consume (when it was CC) and of providing information
(the recommendation). Since reputation-based approaches
have been studied in previous work, we will not focus on
such an approach in this paper. Basing CC’s actions onto a
multi-parametric estimation of the information truthfulness
(having CP’s reputation as one of the parameter) is left for
future work.
3.1 The Basic Credibility Game
The basic Credibility game uses four versions of I: F (bad
looking false), GF (good looking false), BT (bad looking
true), and T (good looking true). The correctness ordering
is: F = GF  T = BT . These versions are described by
the following parameters TF and L: F :(TF = 0, L = 0);
GF :(TF = 0, L = 1); BT :(TF = 1, L = 0); T :(TF = 1,
L = 1).
For simplicity, we consider two types of CP: the honest
CP (CP-H) and the dishonest CP (CP-L). The payoffs of
CC, CP-L and CP-H model their preferences as described
above. We denote as CPX,Y , CCX,Y the expected payoffs
of CP and CC respectively, when CP plays strategy X and
CC plays strategy Y .
Payoffs of CC. CC is indifferent in case of rejection (R):
CCF,R = CCGF,R = CCBT,R = CCT,R = 0
CC’s payoffs in case of acceptance (A) depend only on TF .
CCF,A = CCGF,A = −2 < CCBT,A = CCT,A = 2
Payoffs of CP-L. In case of rejection (R), CP’s payoffs
depend inversely on L and increase with TF , i.e.
CPLGFR = −3 < CP
L
FR = −2 < CP
L
TR = −1 < CP
L
BTR = 0.
In case of acceptance (A), CPL’s payoffs depend inversely
on TF and on L, i.e.
CPLTA = 1 < CP
L
BTA = 2 < CP
L
GFA = 4 < CP
L
FA = 5 .
Payoffs of CP-H. In case of rejection, CP-H has the
same payoffs as CP-L. In case of acceptance, CP-L’s payoffs
depend inversely on L and increase with TF :
CPHGFA = 1 < CP
H
FA = 2 < CP
H
TA = 4 < CP
H
BTA = 5
Table 1: Basic game of
CP-L vs. CC.
Table 2: Basic game of
CP-H vs. CC.
3.2 Analysis of Basic Credibility Game
For CP-L. The game has zero equilibria in pure strate-
gies and one Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. First,
observe that for CP-L the strategy GF is dominated by F
and strategy T is dominated by BT . Then, assume that CP-
L plays the strategy F with probability x and the strategy
BT with probability 1− x. Also, assume that CC plays the
strategy A with probability y and the strategy R with prob-
ability 1−y. Then, the unique Nash equilibrium is given by
x = 1/2 and y = 2/5.
In order to study the evolutionary stability, we take the
replicator dynamics equations [11] to be 0, i.e.
x˙
x
= 5y − 2(1− y)− [x(5y − 2(1− y) + (1− x)2y] = 0
y˙
y
= −2x+ 2(1− x)− [y(−2x+ 2(1− x)) + (1− y)0] = 0
(1)
After some algebra, we obtain two solutions, x = 1, y = 1
and x = 1/2, y = 2/5. However, the solution x = 1, y = 1
is just a fixed point and not evolutionary stable strategy
(ESS), since it is not a Nash equilibrium; an ESS must also
be a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, the only ESS of the game
is x = 1/2, y = 2/5.
For CP-H. The game has 1 equilibria in pure strategies
and 0 Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Observe that
for CP-H the strategy BT is dominant. Anticipating this,
CC’s best response is the strategy A. Therefore, (BT,A) is
the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game. Since (BT,A)
is subgame-perfect equilibrium, it is also ESS.
4. CREDIBILITY SIGNALING GAME
The basic game assumes that the CP-type is observable
by CC, while CC cannot deduce any belief on CP’s strat-
egy (TF , L). Moreover, in the basic game, CP can select
the content truthfulness regardless of her type. Here, we as-
sume that the CP-type determines the content truthfulness,
i.e. CP-H (resp. CP-L) produces truthful (resp. false) con-
tent, but it is hidden from CC. CC always prefers true from
false content and has to decide to Accept(A) or Reject(R)
the Web page information based on the observation of the
signal jointly composed of the truthfulness TF and the pre-
sentation quality L of the information. This signal has an
important role in our model. It can be used to fulfill Re-
quirement 4. Improving the credibility judgments of infor-
mation consumers can be modeled by increasing the role of
TF in the signal. A perfect credibility judgment would be
achieved if the signal depended only on TF . To this end, at
the one extreme, na¨ıve consumers mostly take into account
the presentation quality L of the Web page instead of its
truthfulness TF , while expert consumers will value mostly
its truthfulness. In between these two extremes, several ver-
sions of the signal can be created that depend on both TF
and L. The simplest strategy of CC towards accepting or
not the information of the Web site could use a threshold
for the signal value: if the signal is above the threshold, CC
accepts the produced version of I.
For simplifying the analysis, we assume two types of in-
formation producers: honest (CP-H) that always produce
truthful information and dishonest (or liars, CP-L) that al-
ways produce false information. However, producers may
exert or not a costly effort to improve the presentation qual-
ity of the information. To this end, CP-H can produce infor-
mation versions T , BT by deciding to invest in presentation
quality or not. On the other hand, CP-L can produce the
information versions GF , F if he invests on presentation
quality or not respectively. It will also be possible to ob-
serve the effect of a change in the signal on the equilibrium
analysis of the game and on the strategies of CC and CP.
CC is randomly matched with a CP of certain type. Given
a population mix with a fraction r of honest providers, we
assume that Nature selects with probability r that the CP
has true information (i.e. type CP-H) and with probability
1− r that he has false information (i.e. type CP-L).
In this game, the payoffs of the players are those of the
basic credibility game given in the Tables 1 or 2 for the cases
that CC is matched with CP-L or CP-H respectively. Recall
that the effort for high quality presentation subtracts 1 from
the producer payoffs. The strategic form of this signaling
game is depicted in Figure 1.
Assume that in the FALSE information set, CP plays Not
Invest (i.e. bad looks, L = 0) with probability x1, while
he invests (i.e. good looks, L = 1) with probability 1 − x1.
Also, in the TRUE information set, CP plays Not Invest
(L = 0) with probability x2, while he invests (L = 1) with
probability 1 − x2. On the other hand, in the BAD LOOK
information set, CC plays Accept with probability y1, while,
Figure 1: The signaling game of credibility.
in the GOOD LOOK information set, he plays Accept with
probability y2.
In the TRUE information set, CP-H should be indifferent
in terms of expected payoffs between investing or not on
high quality presentation, therefore, it should be for CP-H
that
x2(5y1 + (1− y1)0) = (1− x2)(4y2 − (1− y2)) . (2)
In the FALSE information set, CP-L should similarly be
indifferent between investing or not on high quality presen-
tation, and thus it should be for CP that
x1(5y1 − (1− y1)2) = (1− x1)(4y2 − 3(1− y2)) . (3)
Regarding the CC strategies, we employ forward induc-
tion as follows: The unconditional probability that the game
reaches the right node of the BAD LOOK information set
is x2r, while for the left node it is x1(1 − r). At the right
node of BAD LOOK, CC would always play Accept, while
at the left node of the same information set, he would al-
ways play Reject. Thus, after observing the BAD LOOK,
the conditional probability that CC assigns of being to the
right node should equal its probability y1 of playing Accept
in this information set, i.e. it should be that
y1 =
x2r
x2r + x1(1− r)
. (4)
Reasoning similarly for the GOOD LOOK information set,
the probability y2 of playing Accept is given by
y2 =
(1− x2)r
(1− x2)r + (1− x1)r
. (5)
The solution to the system of equations (2), (3), (4), (5)
for r=1/2 is given by: x1=0.0283, x2=0.2176, y1=0.8846,
y2=0.4460. This is an assessment (or perfect-Bayesian) equi-
librium of this game.
We study the cases of completely na¨ıve consumers and of
those with some expertise separately below.
4.1 Naïve Consumer
Here, we assume that CC is completely na¨ıve and only
considers whether the Web page is of high presentation qual-
ity or not for credibility evaluation. In other words, CC re-
ceives a signal that depends only on the L property of the
versions of information I. Recall that the truthfulness of the
information depends on whether the CC is matched with
CP-H or CP-L. CC plays Accept with probability y1 = 0
in the BAD LOOK information set, while she plays Accept
with probability y2 = 1 in the GOOD LOOK information
set. Anticipating this, it is dominant strategy for both CP-
L and CP-H to invest in presentation quality against com-
pletely na¨ıve consumers, i.e. x1 = x2 = 0.
4.2 Consumer Expertise
In fact, the game model of Web credibility as a signaling
game (see Figure 1) is very expressive and can be used to
study the behavior of information producers and consumers
for various mixes of CP-H and CP-L and for various ex-
pertise levels of the CC. If the CC is highly-skilled expert,
he can correctly assess the credibility of the information and
find the type of the CP regardless of the presentation quality
of the information. In other words, whether in BAD LOOK
or in GOOD LOOK, CC knows if he is at the right or the
left node of the respective information set and plays accord-
ingly. A highly-skilled expert CC would play Accept (A)
when matched with CP-H and Reject (R) when matched
with CP-L. Anticipating this, neither CP-H or CP-L has
any incentive to invest in high presentation quality against
an expert CC, i.e. x1 = x2 = 1.
On the other hand, if in the CC population consisted of a
fraction f of highly-skilled experts, while the rest were to-
tally na¨ıve, CP would not know in advance the type of the
CC that is matched with. Then, reasoning similarly to the
equilibrium analysis above, CP-H would always play Invest
(i.e. x2 = 0) if f < 0.8, otherwise Not Invest (x2 = 1);
observe that, in the right node of the BAD LOOK informa-
tion set, only expert consumers are expected to play Accept,
while in the right node of the GOOD LOOK information set
all consumers play Accept. Also, CP-L would always play
Invest (x1 = 0) if f < 6/7, otherwise Not Invest (x1 = 1);
here, observe that in the left node of the GOOD LOOK in-
formation set, only na¨ıve consumers play Accept, while in
the left node of the BAD LOOK information set, all con-
sumers play Reject.
In general, there can be CC with various levels of exper-
tise according to which CC assigns a conditional probability
to encounter a CP-H or a CP-L given a certain presenta-
tion quality (i.e. GOOD LOOK or BAD LOOK information
sets). These conditional probabilities determine y1, y2 with
whom CC plays Accept in the BAD LOOK and the GOOD
LOOK information sets respectively and the x1, x2 are then
derived by equations (2) and (3).
5. ECONOMIC MODEL OF CP PAYOFFS
In this section, we show how it is possible to realize Re-
quirement 5. We do so by introducing a utility model for
the content producer that depends on a continuous set of
strategies regarding truthfulness TF and presentation qual-
ity L of the content, and it is consistent with the payoffs
proposed in Section 3. The proposed utility model can be
employed for economic modeling of information production
in more generic cases. In this model, the gain of the CP de-
pends only on TF (increasingly for CP-H and decreasingly
for CP-L), and the cost of producing information depends
increasingly on L, but decreasingly on TF . The latter prop-
erty can be interpreted as it is more costly to manufacture
a falsehood than to tell the truth.
The utility of a content producer is given by:
U(I) = kG(TF )− C(TF,L) , (6)
where k is the number of consumers that have accepted the
CP’s content, G(.) is a function that describes the gain of
CP, and C(., .) is a function that describes the cost of in-
formation production. This utility function models the fact
that the marginal costs of producing information is 0: the
CP only bears a fixed cost of production that does not de-
pend on the number of consumers.
The gain of the content producer is given by:
G(TF ) = αTF + β , (7)
where α > 0 for an honest producer (CP-H), and α < 0 for
a dishonest producer (CP-L).
The cost of the content producer is given by:
C(TF,L) = γTF + δL+  , (8)
where γ < 0 models that increasing the truthfulness TF of
the produced information reduces the cost of its production
(the cost is determined by the cognitive effort for manufac-
turing a falsehood). Also, δ > 0 models that improving the
looks increases the cost, while  > 0 models a fixed cost
component.
Consider the following exemplary parameters for CP-L:
α = −5, β = 7, γ = −2, δ = 1,  = 2. The resulting utility
function is given by:
UL =
{
−3TF − L+ 5 , k = 1
2TF − L− 1 , k = 0
(9)
This utility function produces the payoffs of CP-L for the
basic Credibility Game.
Also, consider the following exemplary parameters for CP-
H: α = 1, β = 4, γ = −2, δ = 1,  = 2. The resulting utility
function is given by:
UH =
{
3TF − L+ 2 , k = 1
2TF − L− 1 , k = 0
(10)
This utility function produces the payoffs for CP-H for the
basic Credibility game. Notice that the cost functions for
CP-H and CP-L do not differ.
6. EVALUATION
In this section, we experimentally analyze the evolution
of the credibility signaling game under provider population
mixes of varying honesty and under consumer population
mixes of varying expertise. Moreover, we vary the trans-
parency of the truthfulness signal to the consumers to assess
cases where different presentation tricks can be employed by
dishonest producers to mislead consumers towards informa-
tion acceptance.
6.1 Simulation Model
Our simulation model builds upon and extends the model
described in Section 4, while employing the generic economic
payoff modeling of Section 5. CC’s expertise is not binary
and it is modeled as a standard deviation of signal that CC
receives before making decision to Accept or Reject the in-
formation. It is assumed that the CP signal has a normal
distribution. Its standard deviation for different consumers
may equal 0.05, 0.083, 0.16, 0.33, 0.66 or 1 according to
their expertise; of course, the larger the standard deviation,
the more na¨ıve the consumer. The mean of the signal is a
weighted average of information truthfulness TF and pre-
sentation quality L. The weight of TF varies for different
simulation experiments and it can be 0.1, 0.33, 0.66 or 0.9.
Recall that, the greater the TF weight, the “better” the sig-
nal reflects the information truthfulness. Since the signal
that CC receives is not binary, there are more than two
information sets in which CC has to make a decision, as
compared to Section 4. CC’s strategy is a certain thresh-
old t ∈ [0, 1], above which CC accepts the information and
below which he rejects it.
We assume a population of 100 producers and 1000 con-
sumers. In the beginning of each simulation experiment, the
types of producers (liar or honest) and consumers (expertise
level) are determined based on the specific simulation pa-
rameters. The player types do not change throughout the
game. A single game round starts with producers choosing
whether to produce information that is good- or bad-looking
according to their strategies, while truthfulness in all but the
last experiment depends on the producer type. Then, each
consumer randomly chooses one producer from the popu-
lation and receives the signal according to the information
properties (TF and L) and the expertise of the consumer.
Based on this signal and the acceptance threshold of the
consumer, the consumer decides to accept or not the infor-
mation. Every 100 rounds (i.e. learning period, referred to
as generation) evolution takes place. It is applied separately
to each type of CC and CP. Entities produce offsprings pro-
portional to their payoff2 and “die”. The offspring inherit
parental strategy. We also include mutation by assuming
that, with 1% probability, a producer does not reproduce
accurately; instead, its offspring chooses a random strategy.
For consumers, we also assume that inheritance is not per-
fect upon mutation and the offspring chooses a threshold
that equals parental threshold ±0.05. A single simulation
run lasts for 100 generations. In the next subsection, we
explore how the simulation results vary with three factors:
share of liars in producers population, fraction of expertise
in consumer population and weight of TF in the information
signal.
6.2 Results
We first consider the case where the truthfulness of the
Web page is a more powerful signal to the consumer than
its presentation quality, i.e. signal truthfulness weight: 0.66,
signal looks weight: 0.33. When honest content producers
constitute the 80% of the producer population (top graphs of
Figure 2(a)), honest CPs do not invest in high presentation
quality, as opposed to dishonest ones, when facing either
experts or na¨ıve CCs. When the population of producers
contains roughly 50% of honest ones (second line of graphs
in Figure 2(a)), then producers exploit different behaviors
when facing consumers of different expertise; honest and liar
producers tend to invest in high presentation quality (i.e.
L = 1) when facing mostly na¨ıve consumers, while they do
not invest in presentation quality (i.e. L = 0) when facing
mostly experts, as predicted by the analysis of Section 4.
The evolution of the consumer acceptance thresholds for
different producer populations is depicted in Figure 2(b).
Na¨ıve consumers employ extremely high (resp. low) thresh-
old when facing mostly liar (resp. honest) producers. Ex-
pert consumers always employ moderately high acceptance
thresholds that tend to be higher when the producer popu-
lation contains more liars.
2A constant is added to payoffs to assure that they are not
negative. Stochastic universal sampling is used to minimize
genetic drift.
0
50
10
0
0
50
10
0
0
50
10
0
0 50 100 0 50 100 0 50 100
0.2 honest CP − 0.0 expert CC 0.2 honest CP − 0.5 expert CC 0.2 honest CP − 1.0 expert CC
0.5 honest CP − 0.0 expert CC 0.5 honest CP − 0.5 expert CC 0.5 honest CP − 1.0 expert CC
0.8 honest CP − 0.0 expert CC 0.8 honest CP − 0.5 expert CC 0.8 honest CP − 1.0 expert CC
1,1 1,0 0,1 0,0
generation
(a)
0
50
0
10
00
0
50
0
10
00
0 50 100 0 50 100
0.2 honest CP − 0.0 expert CC 0.2 honest CP − 1.0 expert CC
0.8 honest CP − 0.0 expert CC 0.8 honest CP − 1.0 expert CC
0 − 0.2 0.2 − 0.4 0.4 − 0.6 0.6 − 0.8 0.8 − 1
generation
(b)
Figure 2: Truthfulness is a more powerful signal than
looks. (a) Producers strategy L evolution regard-
ing presentation quality when facing consumers with
different expertise. (b) Evolution of consumer ac-
ceptance thresholds when facing different CP mixes.
If the consumers give more significance to the presenta-
tion of the page (i.e. signal truthfulness weight: 0.33, signal
looks weight:0.66), then the evolution of producers regarding
their investment strategy L in high quality presentation is
depicted in Figure 3(a). As can be observed therein, honest
producers always invest in high presentation quality, in or-
der to be differentiable from dishonest ones. The dishonest
producers invest less in presentation quality as consumers
become more expert and as the producer population con-
tains more liars, since i) expert CCs cannot be easily fooled
by presentation quality to assess false content as credible and
ii) when the fraction of honest producers in the CP popu-
lation is low, then the acceptance thresholds employed by
the CCs tend to be higher (see Figure 3(b)). As depicted in
Figure 3(b), when presentation signal is stronger than truth-
fulness, acceptance rates of consumers are higher than those
when truthfulness provides a stronger credibility signal than
looks (see Figure 2(b)).
The impact of the strength of the truthfulness signal for
credibility assessment on the L strategy of producers is de-
picted in Figure 4. Here, the producer population contains
50% honest ones, while the consumer population contains
50% experts. However, as expected, if the presentation qual-
ity signal is much appreciated by the consumers (top left
graph in Figure 4), then all consumers behave as na¨ıve ones,
and thus all producers invest in presentation quality. On the
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Figure 3: Looks signal is a more powerful than truth-
fulness. (a) Producers strategy evolution regard-
ing presentation quality when facing consumers with
different expertise. (b) Evolution of consumer ac-
ceptance thresholds when facing different CP mixes.
other hand, if the information truthfulness signal is strong
for the consumers, then all consumers behave as experts,
and thus all producers do not invest in presentation quality.
These results totally agree with the analysis of the signal-
ing game in Section 4. Specifically, it was expected that for
highly-skilled expert consumers it would be at equilibrium
that x1 = x2 = 0, while for totally na¨ıve ones it would be
x1 = x2 = 1 at equilibrium. Our experimental results for
the other weights of the information truthfulness in the sig-
nal can still be explained based on the analysis of Section 4.
Finally, we allow producers of both types (i.e. initially
50% honest and 50% liars) to modify their truthfulness strat-
egy TF along with their strategy L for presentation quality
according to their economic fitness given their respective
payoffs in Tables 1, 2. Figure 5 depicts producer strat-
egy evolution under different truthfulness signal strengths
and different consumer expertise. As expected, when pre-
sentation quality signal is strong (i.e. TF weight: 0.33),
producers of both types invest in high presentation quality
(L = 1), while keeping their respective truthfulness strate-
gies unaltered (TF = 1 for honest and TF = 0 for dishonest)
when facing na¨ıve consumers. As consumer expertise rises
or truthfulness signal strength increases, all producers in-
vest less in presentation quality, while dishonest producers
become truthful!
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Figure 4: Producers strategy evolution regarding
presentation quality when truthfulness signal has
different weights (0.1, 0.33, 0.66, 0.9) for consumers.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a new game model of Web
content credibility. The model incorporates incentives and
strategies of both producers and consumers of Web content.
Using the proposed Web credibility game, it is possible to
study the strategy evolution of populations of Web content
producers and consumers with different honesty and exper-
tise respectively. Therefore, it can be an important tool for
modeling the strategy dynamics regarding the credibility of
Web content. Also, presentation quality has been consid-
ered in our model as part of a signal to the content con-
sumer. However, our game model is generic enough to con-
sider arbitrary signaling means from the content producer
to consumer. In the analysis and the simulation of the Cred-
ibility Game, we have considered simple strategies for both
producers and consumers. As a future work, research on
credibility assessment support should consider more sophis-
ticated strategies. Moreover, incorporating user feedback on
Web credibility is a natural extension to the model, which
would add a certain consumer belief on the Web content
producer type.
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